In Eurocrypt '2009 ' , Wu et al. (2009 presented an important primitive named the asymmetric group key agreement (AGKA) protocol. In such a primitive, a group of users generate a common public encryption key, and each user only holds his own secret decryption key. Authenticated asymmetric group key agreement (AAGKA) protocols are a kind of AGKA protocol that can be secure against active attacks. AAGKA protocols in certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) have some preponderance than those in identity-based cryptography and PKI cryptography. However, existing AAGKA protocols in CL-PKC only consider security against normal type adversaries, the weakest adversaries considered in CL-PKC literature. To solve this problem, an improved security model that considers security against super adversaries and a provably secure certificateless AAGKA protocol under the improved security model are proposed. Efficiency comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more efficient.
Introduction
Group key agreement (GKA) protocols allow a group of users to agree on a common secret key through public channel, which serves as the encryption key of symmetric encryption. GKA protocols are widely used in group oriented applications, such as multicast communications and social communications. Since this primitive was proposed, many GKA protocols (e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] ) have been built. However, GKA protocols are subject to a specific problem, i.e., any user outside the group cannot send messages to group internal users, since only they know the secret key. To address this problem, Wu et al. [5] presented an important primitive named the asymmetric group key agreement (AGKA) protocol. Generally speaking, in such a protocol, a batch of users can agree on a common public encryption key while their respective private decryption keys are different and secret. Naturally, AGKA protocols can be applied to the above group-oriented applications. Since this primitive was proposed, some AGKA protocols (e.g., [6] [7] [8] ) have been proposed. However, these protocols are only secure against passive attacks. In practice, adversaries can mount powerful attacks, e.g., by modifying, replaying, or deleting messages. Based on this idea, the notion of an authenticated asymmetric group key agreement (AAGKA) protocol [9] is proposed, which ensures that any outside user cannot possibly gain a decryption key in the presence of the active attacker.
With the help of various public key cryptography (e.g. the PKI cryptography, identity-based cryptography [10] , and certificateless cryptography [11] ), AAGKA protocols can be realized. By the definition of trust hierarchy given in [12] , AAGKA protocols under the PKI cryptography [9, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] can achieve trust level 3. However, there is a certificate management problem. Instead of certificates, users' public keys are their identities, such as their email addresses or telephone numbers in identity-based AAGKA protocols [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Thus, identity-based AAGKA protocols eliminate the certificate management problems. However, identity-based AAGKA protocols are subject to a key escrow problem, since a trusted party Key Generator Centre (KGC) generates all users' private keys. Certificateless AAGKA (CL-AAGKA) protocols [23] [24] [25] [26] avoid the above key escrow and certificate management problem since KGC generates a component of the user's private key, and the user secretly generates the other component and derives his public key without any certificate.
Wei et al. [23] proposed the first CL-AAGKA protocol in 2012. However, there was no formal security definition for CL-AAGKA protocols in [23] . Lv et al. [24] proposed the first security model for CL-AAGKA protocols in 2014. However, it does not capture known-key security. Later, Zhang et al. [25] put forward a new security model that can capture knownkey security, secrecy, and partial forward security. The security model in [26] is the same as that in [25] . However, adversaries in these security models own a parallel power as the "normal adversaries" [27] , the weakest adversaries in certificateless public key cryptography literature. Similar to [27] , if a CL-AAGKA protocol is secure against "super adversaries" and more powerful than "normal and strong adversaries", the security level would be enhanced. In fact, super adversaries should be considered for CL-AAGKA protocols. For the existing AGKA protocols, messages used to generate group keys are all based on elements named batch multi-signature schemes, which means that it would be better if messages can be generated under the new public keys if replaced. Based on these, we design an improved security model and a strongly secure CL-AAGKA protocol.
In this paper, we propose an improved security model for CL-AAGKA, which considers the most powerful adversaries (i.e., super adversaries). On the basis of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption, we propose a provably secure CL-AGAKA protocol under the improved security model. Moreover, efficiency comparison shows that the proposed protocol is more efficient.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Maps
Let P be the generator of an additive group G of prime order q and G T be a multiplicative group of q. A map T e G G G    is said to be a bilinear map if it meets the following requirements [26] :
Computability: e is efficiently computable.
Complexity Assumption
-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent ( -BDHE) Problem [26] : Given P, Q, and
) . e P Q    -BDHE assumption means that for any polynomial-time algorithm ,
Our Improved Security Model
Based on the security models in [25] [26] , an improved security model for CL-AAGKA protocols is proposed in this section.
Notations
For the security model, we need some notations shown in Table 1 . Remark 1 Known key secrecy, partial forward security, and super security are captured in the above security model. Our security model considers security against super adversaries under queries including Public-Key-Replacement, SuperSend, Encryption-Key, and Super-Decryption-Key. After Public-Key-Replacement queries, the challenger sets the new secret value to null, which means that  has to correctly answer any query without knowing the new secret value, i.e., messages, the encryption key, and the decryption key all should be generated under the new public keys if replaced.
Our Proposed Protocol
A CL-AAGKA protocol motivated by [19, 28] is proposed in this section. It consists of three stages (ten algorithms). 
If it is equal, the group encryption key is set to () WY  , where
Note that any outside user can also compute () WY  , since these values are public. 
Decrypt
In general, it is supposed that Create queries on related participants have been made before the following queries.
Public-Key
and then does as follows:
2) Else output i D as the answer. . 
Secret-Value
( i U ): Suppose i U 's identity is i ID .  obtains 1 () i i i i i i H ID D x P       from C L and then outputs . i x Public-Key-Replacement ( ii UP   )): Suppose i U 's identity is i ID .  obtains 1 () i i i i i i H ID D x P       from C Li x null  Super-Send ( i U     ):  maintains a list S L of tuples ( ). i i U i i i ID sid r V      Assume i U pid   12 { }. n ID ID ID     first recovers , U i sid   searches for a tuple 1 () i i i i i i H ID D x P       in , C Li i i i R r P h P  2) Set 2 () i i i i H ID R P h    and add () i i i i ID R P h    to the list 2 . H L 3) For 1 jn , compute . i j i i i j i j V D P r c P rT       4) Add () i i U i i i ID sid r V      to S L and publish {1 } ( { } ). i i i j j n j i R P V         Else if 1 ( ) (0 1) i U i sid H      ,. n i i i i k k R r P h P T       2) Set 2 () i i i i H ID R P h    and add () i i i i ID R P h    to the list 2 . H L 3) For 1 jn , compute 11 1 . n k j i j i i j i j i i i j j k k V T P c R c h P rT T               4) Add () i i U i i i ID sid r V      to S Li i i i i R r P h P T     2) Set 2 () i i i i H ID R P h    and add () i i i i ID R P h    to the list 2 . H L 3) For 1 j n i j     , compute 11 . i j i i j i j i i i j j i V T P c R c h P rT T            4) Add () i i U i ID sid r null     to S L and publish {1 2 } ( { } ). i i i j j n j i R P V          Else if 1 ( ) (1 1) i U i sid H      ,n k i k j i j i i j i j i i i j j k k V T P c R c h P rT T                  4) Add () i i U i ID sid r null     to S L and publish {1 2 } ( { } ). i i i j j n j i R P V         Encryption-Key ( i U   ): Assume 1 { }, i Un tran      where ( k k k RP     {1 2 } { } ). k j j n j k V        If i U state  is not accepted,  returns ; null otherwise,  outputs () WY  where 2 1 ( ( ) ), n k k k k k k W R H ID R P P       13 11 (( ) ) ( ( )){1 2 } ( { } ), k k k k j j n j k R P V            compute and output 1 n i k i k dk V     .
Test
.  does as follows: 
e V P e id T e P Z e R h P z
If all the equations hold, turn Step (4). Otherwise, abort (E4).
4) For 1 kn
, recover 12 n r r r (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 
Efficiency Comparison
Up to now, protocols [23] [24] [25] [26] are CL-AAGKA protocols. The results of efficiency comparison with them are listed in Table  2 . Two high time complexity operations are considered, i.e., the pairing operation (denoted by P) and the scalar multiplication operation in G (denoted by M). In our protocol, the computation cost in key-agreement phase for a participant is (n + 2)M, and the computation cost in Encrypt-Key-Gen and Encrypt-Key-Gen phases for a participant is 6P + nM. Thus, in our protocol the total computation cost in Stage 2 for a participant is 6P + 2(n + 1)M. We use the experimental results in [29] , i.e., the time consumption of P and M are 11.25ms and 3.75ms, respectively. According to Table 2 , our protocol will be more efficient than other protocols [23] [24] [25] [26] with an increase in group size.
Conclusions
An improved security model under super adversaries and a provably secure CL-AAGKA protocol are proposed. Efficiency comparison shows that our protocol is more efficient. Thus, it is more competitive in security and efficiency.
